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Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part. The portions of the Court's opinion that I have joined ì are more important than those with which I disagree. I shall ì therefore first comment on significant areas of agreement, and ì then explain the limited character of my disagreement. ÇÇ! I The Court is unquestionably correct in concluding that ì the doctrine of stare decisis has controlling significance in a ì case of this kind, notwithstanding an individual justice's ì concerns about the merits. The central holding of Roe v. Wade, ì 410 U. S. 113 (1973), has been a part of our law for almost two ì decades. Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. ì S. 52, 101 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting ì in part). It was a natural sequel to the protection of ì individual liberty established in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 ì U. S. 479 (1965). See also Carey v. Population Services Int'l, ì 431 U. S. 678, 687, 702 (1977) (White, J., concurring in part and ì concurring in result). The societal costs of overruling Roe at ì this late date would be enormous. Roe is an integral part of a ì correct understanding of both the concept of liberty and the ì basic equality of men and women. Stare decisis also provides a sufficient basis for my ì agreement with the joint opinion's reaffirmation of Roe's ì post-viability analysis. Specifically, I accept the proposition ì that [i]f the State is interested in protecting fetal life after ì viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that ì period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or ì health of the mother. 410 U. S., at 163-164; see ante, at 36-37. I also accept what is implicit in the Court's analysis, ì namely, a reaffirmation of Roe's explanation of why the State's ì obligation to protect the life or health of the mother must take ì precedence over any duty to the unborn. The Court in Roe ì carefully considered, and rejected, the State's argument that the ì fetus is a `person' within the language and meaning of the ì Fourteenth Amendment. 410 U. S., at 156. After analyzing the ì usage of person in the Constitution, the Court concluded that ì that word has application only postnatally. Id., at 157. ì Commenting on the contingent property interests of the unborn ì that are generally represented by guardians ad litem, the Court ì noted: Perfection of the interests involved, again, has ì generally been contingent upon live birth. In short, the unborn ì have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole ì sense. Id., at 162. Accordingly, an abortion is not the ì termination of life entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection. ì Id., at 159. From this holding, there was no dissent, see id., ì at 173; indeed, no member of the Court has ever questioned this ì fundamental proposition. Thus, as a matter of federal ì constitutional law, a developing organism that is not yet a ì person does not have what is sometimes described as a right to ì life. This has been and, by the Court's holding today, remains a ≡7É3 ìèfundamental premise of our constitutional law governing ì reproductive autonomy. &&! II My disagreement with the joint opinion begins with its ì understanding of the trimester framework established in Roe. ì Contrary to the suggestion of the joint opinion, ante, at 33, it ì is not a contradiction to recognize that the State may have a ì legitimate interest in potential human life and, at the same ì time, to conclude that that interest does not justify the ì regulation of abortion before viability (although other ì interests, such as maternal health, may). The fact that the ì State's interest is legitimate does not tell us when, if ever, ì that interest outweighs the pregnant woman's interest in personal ì liberty. It is appropriate, therefore, to consider more ì carefully the nature of the interests at stake. First, it is clear that, in order to be legitimate, the ì State's interest must be secular; consistent with the First ì Amendment the State may not promote a theological or sectarian ì interest. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians ì and Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747, 778 (1986) (Stevens, J., ì concurring); see generally Webster v. Reproductive Health ì Services, 492 U. S. 490, 563-572 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring ì in part and dissenting in part). Moreover, as discussed above, ì the state interest in potential human life is not an interest in ì loco parentis, for the fetus is not a person. Identifying the State's interests "which the States ì rarely articulate with any precision "makes clear that the ì interest in protecting potential life is not grounded in the ì Constitution. It is, instead, an indirect interest supported by ì both humanitarian and pragmatic concerns. Many of our citizens ì believe that any abortion reflects an unacceptable disrespect for ì potential human life and that the performance of more than a ì million abortions each year is intolerable; many find ì third-trimester abortions performed when the fetus is approaching ì personhood particularly offensive. The State has a legitimate ì interest in minimizing such offense. The State may also have a ì broader interest in expanding the population, believing society ì would benefit from the services of additional productive citizens ì "or that the potential human lives might include the occasional ì Mozart or Curie." These are the kinds of concerns that comprise ì the State's interest in potential human life. In counterpoise is the woman's constitutional interest in ì liberty. One aspect of this liberty is a right to bodily ì integrity, a right to control one's person. See e.g., Rochin v. ì California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. ì 535 (1942). This right is neutral on the question of abortion: ì The Constitution would be equally offended by an absolute ì requirement that all women undergo abortions as by an absolute ì prohi- bition on abortions. Our whole constitutional heritage ì rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control ≡7É3 ìèmen's minds. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 565 (1969). ì The same holds true for the power to control women's bodies. /* Stanley vs. Georgia being the case in which the Supreme Court ì held that the private possession of obscene material (other than ì child pronography) by adults in the privacy of their homes, is ì legal. */ The woman's constitutional liberty interest also involves ì her freedom to decide matters of the highest privacy and the most ì personal nature. Cf. Whalen v. Roe, 409 U. S. 589, 598-600 ì (1977). A woman considering abortion faces a difficult choice ì having serious and personal consequences of major importance to ì her own future "perhaps to the salvation of her own immortal ì soul." Thornburgh, 476 U. S., at 781. The authority to make ì such traumatic and yet empowering decisions is an element of ì basic human dignity. As the joint opinion so eloquently ì demonstrates, a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy is ì nothing less than a matter of conscience. Weighing the State's interest in potential life and the ì woman's liberty interest, I agree with the joint opinion that the ì State may `expres[s] a preference for normal childbirth,' that ì the State may take steps to ensure that a woman's choice is ì thoughtful and informed, and that States are free to enact laws ì to provide a reasonable framework for a woman to make a decision ì that has such profound and lasting meaning. Ante, at 30. ì Serious questions arise, however, when a State attempts to ì persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion. Ante, at ì 36. Decisional autonomy must limit the State's power to inject ì into a woman's most personal deliberations its own views of what ì is best. The State may promote its preferences by funding ì childbirth, by creating and maintaining alternatives to abortion, ì and by espousing the virtues of family; but it must respect the ì individual's freedom to make such judgments. This theme runs throughout our decisions concerning ì reproductive freedom. In general, Roe's requirement that ì restrictions on abortions before viability be justified by the ì State's interest in maternal health has prevented States from ì interjecting regulations designed to influence a woman's ì decision. Thus, we have upheld regulations of abortion that are ì not efforts to sway or direct a woman's choice but rather are ì efforts to enhance the deliberative quality of that decision or ì are neutral regulations on the health aspects of her decision. ì We have, for example, upheld regulations requiring written ì informed consent, see Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. ì Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976); limited recordkeeping and ì reporting, see ibid.; and pathology reports, see Planned ì Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U. S. ì 476 (1983); as well as various licensing and qualification ì provisions, see e.g., Roe, 410 U. S., at 150; Simopoulos v. ì Virginia, 462 U. S. 506 (1983). Conversely, we have consistently ì rejected state efforts to prejudice a woman's choice, either by ≡7É3 ìèlimiting the information available to her, see Bigelow v. ì Virginia, 421 U. S. 809 (1975), or by requir[ing] the delivery of ì information designed `to influence the woman's informed choice ì between abortion or childbirth.' Thornburgh, 476 U. S., at 760; ì see also Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 ì U. S. 416, 442-449 (1983). In my opinion, the principles established in this long ì line of cases and the wisdom reflected in Justice Powell's ì opinion for the Court in Akron (and followed by the Court just ì six years ago in Thornburgh) should govern our decision today. ì Under these principles, 3205(a)(2)(i)-(iii) of the Pennsylvania ì statute are unconstitutional. Those sections require a physician ì or counselor to provide the woman with a range of materials ì clearly designed to persuade her to choose not to undergo the ì abortion. While the State is free, pursuant to 3208 of the ì Pennsylvania law, to produce and disseminate such material, the ì State may not inject such information into the woman's ì deliberations just as she is weighing such an important choice. Under this same analysis, 3205(a)(1)(i) and (iii) of the ì Pennsylvania statute are constitutional. Those sections, which ì require the physician to inform a woman of the nature and risks ì of the abortion procedure and the medical risks of carrying to ì term, are neutral requirements comparable to those imposed in ì other medical procedures. Those sections indicate no effort by ì the State to influence the woman's choice in any way. If ì anything, such requirements enhance, rather than skew, the ì woman's decisionmaking. ╠╠! III The 24-hour waiting period required by 3205- (a)(1)-(2) ì of the Pennsylvania statute raises even more serious concerns. ì Such a requirement arguably furthers the State's interests in two ì ways, neither of which is constitutionally permissible. First, it may be argued that the 24-hour delay is ì justified by the mere fact that it is likely to reduce the number ì of abortions, thus furthering the State's interest in potential ì life. But such an argument would justify any form of coercion ì that placed an obstacle in the woman's path. The State cannot ì further its interests by simply wearing down the ability of the ì pregnant woman to exercise her constitutional right. Second, it can more reasonably be argued that the 24-hour ì delay furthers the State's interest in ensuring that the woman's ì decision is informed and thoughtful. But there is no evidence ì that the mandated delay benefits women or that it is necessary to ì enable the physician to convey any relevant information to the ì patient. The mandatory delay thus appears to rest on outmoded ì and unacceptable assumptions about the decisionmaking capacity of ì women. While there are wellestablished and consistently ì maintained reasons for the State to view with skepticism the ì ability of minors to make decisions, see Hodgson v. Minnesota, ≡7É3 ìè497 U. S. 417, 449 (1990), none of those reasons applies to an ì adult woman's decisionmaking ability. Just as we have left ì behind the belief that a woman must consult her husband before ì undertaking serious matters, see ante, at 54-57, so we must ì reject the notion that a woman is less capable of deciding ì matters of gravity. Cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971). /* The Court here noting the insulting and condescending aspects ì of regulations designed to protect women from themselves. */ In the alternative, the delay requirement may be premised ì on the belief that the decision to terminate a pregnancy is ì presumptively wrong. This premise is illegitimate. Those who ì disagree vehemently about the legality and morality of abortion ì agree about one thing: The decision to terminate a pregnancy is ì profound and difficult. No person undertakes such a decision ì lightly"and States may not presume that a woman has failed to ì reflect adequately merely because her conclusion differs from the ì State's preference. A woman who has, in the privacy of her ì thoughts and conscience, weighed the options and made her ì decision cannot be forced to reconsider all, simply because the ì State believes she has come to the wrong conclusion. Part of the constitutional liberty to choose is the equal ì dignity to which each of us is entitled. A woman who decides to ì terminate her pregnancy is entitled to the same respect as a ì woman who decides to carry the fetus to term. The mandatory ì waiting period denies women that equal respect. &&! IV In my opinion, a correct application of the undue burden ì standard leads to the same conclusion concerning the ì constitutionality of these requirements. A state-imposed burden ì on the exercise of a constitutional right is measured both by its ì effects and by its character: A burden may be undue either ì because the burden is too severe or because it lacks a ì legitimate, rational justification. The 24-hour delay requirement fails both parts of this ì test. The findings of the District Court establish the severity ì of the burden that the 24-hour delay imposes on many pregnant ì women. Yet even in those cases in which the delay is not ì especially onerous, it is, in my opinion, undue because there is ì no evidence that such a delay serves a useful and legitimate ì purpose. As indicated above, there is no legitimate reason to ì require a woman who has agonized over her decision to leave the ì clinic or hospital and return again another day. While a general ì requirement that a physician notify her patients about the risks ì of a proposed medical procedure is appropriate, a rigid ì requirement that all patients wait 24 hours or (what is true in ì practice) much longer to evaluate the significance of information ì that is either common knowledge or irrelevant is an irrational ≡7É3 ìèand, therefore, undue burden. The counseling provisions are similarly infirm. Whenever ì government commands private citizens to speak or to listen, ì careful review of the justification for that command is ì particularly appropriate. In this case, the Pennsylvania statute ì directs that counselors provide women seeking abortions with ì information concerning alternatives to abortion, the availability ì of medical assistance benefits, and the possibility of child- ì support payments. 3205(a)(2)(i)-(iii). The statute requires ì that this information be given to all women seeking abortions, ì including those for whom such information is clearly useless, ì such as those who are married, those who have undergone the ì procedure in the past and are fully aware of the options, and ì those who are fully convinced that abortion is their only ì reasonable option. Moreover, the statute requires physicians to ì inform all of their patients of the probable gestational age of ì the unborn child. 3205(a)(1)(ii). This information is of little ì decisional value in most cases, because 90% of all abortions are ì performed during the first trimester when fetal age has less ì relevance than when the fetus nears viability. Nor can the ì information required by the statute be justified as relevant to ì any philosophic or social argument, ante, at 30, either favoring ì or disfavoring the abortion decision in a particular case. In ì light of all of these facts, I conclude that the information ì requirements in 3205(a)(1)(ii) and 3205(a)(2)(i)-(iii) do not ì serve a useful purpose and thus constitute an unnecessary "and ì therefore undue" burden on the woman's constitutional liberty to ì decide to terminate her pregnancy. Accordingly, while I disagree with Parts IV, V-B, and V-D ì of the joint opinion, I join the remainder of the Court's ì opinion. Justice Blackmun, concurring in part, concurring in the ì judgment in part, and dissenting in part. I join parts I, II, III, V-A, V-C, and VI of the joint ì opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, ante. Three years ago, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., ì 492 U. S. 490 (1989), four Members of this Court appeared poised ì to cas[t] into darkness the hopes and visions of every woman in ì this country who had come to believe that the Constitution ì guaranteed her the right to reproductive choice. Id., at 557 ì (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See id., at 499 (opinion of ì Rehnquist, C.J.); id., at 532 (opinion of Scalia, J.). All that ì remained between the promise of Roe and the darkness of the ì plurality was a single, flickering flame. Decisions since ì Webster gave little reason to hope that this flame would cast ì much light. See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive ì Health, 497 U. S. 502, 524 (1990) (opinion of Blackmun, J.). But ì now, just when so many expected the darkness to fall, the flame ì has grown bright. ≡7É3 è I do not underestimate the significance of today's joint ì opinion. Yet I remain steadfast in my belief that the right to ì reproductive choice is entitled to the full protection afforded ì by this Court before Webster. And I fear for the darkness as ì four Justices anxiously await the single vote necessary to ì extinguish the light. ÇÇ! I Make no mistake, the joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, ì Kennedy, and Souter is an act of personal courage and ì constitutional principle. In contrast to previous decisions in ì which Justices O'Connor and Kennedy postponed reconsideration of Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the authors of the joint ì opinion today join Justice Stevens and me in concluding that the ì essential holding of Roe should be retained and once again ì reaffirmed. Ante, at 3. In brief, five Members of this Court ì today recognize that the Constitution protects a woman's right to ì terminate her pregnancy in its early stages. Id., at 1. A fervent view of individual liberty and the force of ì stare decisis have led the Court to this conclusion. Ante, at ì 11. Today a majority reaffirms that the Due Process Clause of ì the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a realm of personal liberty ì which the government may not enter, ante, at 5 "a realm whose ì outer limits cannot be determined by interpretations of the ì Constitution that focus only on the specific practices of States ì at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. See ante, at ì 6. Included within this realm of liberty is `the right of the ì individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted ì governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a ì person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.'" Ante, ì at 9, quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453 (1972) ì (emphasis in original). These matters, involving the most ì intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, ì choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to ì the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Ante, at 9 ì (emphasis added). Finally, the Court today recognizes that in ì the case of abortion, the liberty of the woman is at stake in a ì sense unique to the human condition and so unique to the law. ì The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to ì anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she must ì bear. Ante, at 10. The Court's reaffirmation of Roe's central holding is ì also based on the force of stare decisis. [N]o erosion of ì principle going to liberty or personal autonomy has left Roe's ì central holding a doctrinal remnant; Roe portends no developments ì at odds with other precedent for the analysis of personal ì liberty; and no changes of fact have rendered viability more or ì less appropriate as the point at which the balance of interests ì tips. Ante, at 18. Indeed, the Court acknowledges that Roe's ì limitation on state power could not be removed without serious ì inequity to those who have relied upon it or significant damage ì to the stability of the society governed by the rule in question. ≡7É3 ìèAnte, at 13. In the 19 years since Roe was decided, that case ì has shaped more than reproductive planning" an entire generation ì has come of age free to assume Roe's concept of liberty in ì defining the capacity of women to act in society and to make ì reproductive decisions. Ante, at 18. The Court understands ì that, having call[ed] the contending sides . . . to end their ì national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the ì Constitution, ante, at 24, a decision to overrule Roe would ì seriously weaken the Court's capacity to exercise the judicial ì power and to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated ì to the rule of law. Ante, at 22. What has happened today should ì serve as a model for future Justices and a warning to all who ì have tried to turn this Court into yet another political branch. In striking down the Pennsylvania statute's spousal ì notification requirement, the Court has established a framework ì for evaluating abortion regulations that responds to the social ì context of women facing issues of reproductive choice. In ì determining the burden imposed by the challenged regulation, the ì Court inquires whether the regulation's purpose or effect is to ì place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an ì abortion before the fetus attains viability. Ante, at 35 ì (emphasis added). The Court reaffirms: The proper focus of ì constitu- tional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a ì restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant. Ante, ì at 53-54. Looking at this group, the Court inquires, based on ì expert testimony, empirical studies, and common sense, whether in ì a large fraction of the cases in which [the restriction] is ì relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's ì choice to undergo an abortion. Id., at 54. A statute with this ì purpose is invalid because the means chosen by the State to ì further the interest in potential life must be calculated to ì inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it. Ante, at 35. And ì in applying its test, the Court remains sensitive to the unique ì role of women in the decision-making process. Whatever may have ì been the practice when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, the ì Court observes, [w]omen do not lose their constitutionally ì protected liberty when they marry. The Constitution protects all ì individuals, male or female, married or unmarried, from the abuse ì of governmental power, even where that power is employed for the ì supposed benefit of a member of the individual's family. Ante, ì at 57-58. Lastly, while I believe that the joint opinion errs in ì failing to invalidate the other regulations, I am pleased that ì the joint opinion has not ruled out the possibility that these ì regulations may be shown to impose an unconstitutional burden. ì The joint opinion makes clear that its specific holdings are ì based on the insufficiency of the record before it. See, e.g., ì id., at 43. I am confident that in the future evidence will be ì produced to show that in a large fraction of the cases in which ì [these regulations are] relevant, [they] will operate as a ì substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion. ì Ante, at 54. /* An invitation for the court to later reconsider these matters. ≡7É3 ìè*/ &&! II Today, no less than yesterday, the Constitution and ì decisions of this Court require that a State's abortion ì restrictions be subjected to the strictest of judicial scrutiny. ì Our precedents and the joint opinion's principles require us to ì subject all non-de minimis abortion regulations to strict ì scrutiny. Under this standard, the Pennsylvania statute's ì provisions requiring content-based counseling, a 24-hour delay, ì informed parental consent, and reporting of abortion-related ì information must be invalidated. ÇÇ! A The Court today reaffirms the long recognized rights of ì privacy and bodily integrity. As early as 1891, the Court held, ì [n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by ì the commonlaw, than the right of every individual to the ì possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint ì or interference of others . . . . Union Pacific R. Co. v. ì Botsford, 141 U. S. 250, 251 (1891). Throughout this century, ì this Court also has held that the fundamental right of privacy ì protects citizens against governmental intrusion in such intimate ì family matters as procreation, childrearing, marriage, and ì contraceptive choice. See ante, at 5-6. These cases embody the ì principle that personal decisions that profoundly affect bodily ì integrity, identity, and destiny should be largely beyond the ì reach of government. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S., at 453. In Roe v. ì Wade, this Court correctly applied these principles to a woman's ì right to choose abortion. State restrictions on abortion violate a woman's right of ì privacy in two ways. First, compelled continuation of a ì pregnancy infringes upon a woman's right to bodily integrity by ì imposing substantial physical intrusions and significant risks of ì physical harm. During pregnancy, women experience dramatic ì physical changes and a wide range of health consequences. Labor ì and delivery pose additional health risks and physical demands. ì In short, restrictive abortion laws force women to endure ì physical invasions far more substantial than those this Court has ì held to violate the constitutional principle of bodily integrity ì in other contexts. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 ì (1985) (invalidating surgical removal of bullet from murder ì suspect); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) ì (invalidating stomach-pumping). Further, when the State restricts a woman's right to ì terminate her pregnancy, it deprives a woman of the right to make ì her own decision about reproduction and family planning "critical ì life choices" that this Court long has deemed central to the ì right to privacy. The decision to terminate or continue a ì pregnancy has no less an impact on a woman's life than decisions ≡7É3 ìèabout contraception or marriage. 410 U.S., at 153. Because ì motherhood has a dramatic impact on a woman's educational ì prospects, employment opportunities, and self- determination, ì restrictive abortion laws deprive her of basic control over her ì life. For these reasons, the decision whether or not to beget or ì bear a child lies at the very heart of this cluster of ì constitutionally protected choices. Carey v. Population ì Services, Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). A State's restrictions on a woman's right to terminate ì her pregnancy also implicate constitutional guarantees of gender ì equality. State restrictions on abortion compel women to ì continue pregnancies they otherwise might terminate. By ì restricting the right to terminate pregnancies, the State ì conscripts women's bodies into its service, forcing women to ì continue their pregnancies, suffer the pains of childbirth, and ì in most instances, provide years of maternal care. The State ì does not compensate women for their services; instead, it assumes ì that they owe this duty as a matter of course. This assumption ì "that women can simply be forced to accept the natural status and ì incidents of motherhood" appears to rest upon a conception of ì women's role that has triggered the protection of the Equal ì Protection Clause. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. ì Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 724-726 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. ì 190, 198-199 (1976). The joint opinion recognizes that these ì assumptions about women's place in society are no longer ì consistent with our understanding of the family, the individual, ì or the Constitution. Ante, at 55. ÇÇ! B The Court has held that limitations on the right of ì privacy are permissible only if they survive strict ì constitutional scrutiny "that is, only if the governmental entity ì imposing the restriction can demonstrate that the limitation is ì both necessary and narrowly tailored to serve a compelling ì governmental interest." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, ì 485 (1965). We have applied this principle specifically in the ì context of abortion regulations. Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 155. Roe implemented these principles through a framework that ì was designed to insure that the woman's right to choose not ì become so subordinate to the State's interest in promoting fetal ì life that her choice exists in theory but not in fact, ante, at ì 30. Roe identified two relevant State interests: an interest in ì preserving and pro- tecting the health of the pregnant woman and ì an interest in protecting the potentiality of human life. 410 U. ì S., at 162. With respect to the State's interest in the health ì of the mother, the `compelling' point . . . is at approximately ì the end of the first trimester, because it is at that point that ì the mortality rate in abortion approaches that in childbirth. ì Roe, 410 U. S., at 163. With respect to the State's interest in ì potential life, the `compelling' point is at viability, because ì it is at that point that the fetus presumably has the capability ì of meaningful life outside the mother's womb. Ibid. In order to ≡7É3 ìèfulfill the requirement of narrow tailoring, the State is ì obligated to make a reasonable effort to limit the effect of its ì regulations to the period in the trimester during which its ì health interest will be furthered. Akron, 462 U. S., at 434. In my view, application of this analytical frame- work is ì no less warranted than when it was approved by seven Members of ì this Court in Roe. Strict scrutiny of state limitations on ì reproductive choice still offers the most secure protection of ì the woman's right to make her own reproductive decisions, free ì from state coercion. No majority of this Court has ever agreed ì upon an alternative approach. The factual premises of the ì trimester framework have not been undermined, see Webster, 492 ì U.S., at 553 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and the Roe framework is ì far more administrable, and far less manipulable, than the undue ì burden standard adopted by the joint opinion. Nonetheless, three criticisms of the trimester framework ì continue to be uttered. First, the trimester framework is ì attacked because its key elements do not appear in the text of ì the Consti tution. My response to this attack remains the same ì as it was in Webster: Were this a true concern, we would have to abandon most ì of our constitutional jurispru- dence. [T]he `critical elements' ì of countless constitutional doctrines nowhere appear in the Constitution's text . . . . The Constitution makes no ì mention, for example, of the First Amendment's `actual malice' ì standard for proving certain libels, see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). . . . Similarly, the Constitution makes no mention of the ì rational-basis test, or the specific verbal formulations of ì intermediate and strict scrutiny by which this Court evaluates ì claims under the Equal Protection Clause. The reason is simple. ì Like the Roe framework, these tests or standards are not, and do ì not purport to be, rights protected by the Constitution. Rather, ì they are judge-made methods for evaluating and measuring the ì strength and scope of constitutional rights or for balancing the ì constitutional rights of individuals against the competing ì interests of government. 492 U.S., at 548. The second criticism is that the framework more closely ì resembles a regulatory code than a body of constitutional ì doctrine. Again, my answer remains the same as in Webster. [I]f this were a true and genuine concern, we would have ì to abandon vast areas of our constitutional jurisprudence. . . . ì Are [the distinctions entailed in the trimester framework] any ì finer, or more `regulatory,' than the distinctions we have often ì drawn in our First Amendment jurisprudence, where, for example, ì we have held that a `release time' program permitting ì public-school students to leave school grounds during school ì hours receive religious instruction does not violate the ≡7É3 ìèEstablishment Clause, even though a release- time program ì permitting religious instruction on school grounds does violate ì the Clause? Compare Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), with ì Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of School Dist. ì No. 71, Champaign County, 333 U.S. 203 (1948). . . . Similarly, ì in a Sixth Amendment case, the Court held that although an ì overnight ban on attorney-client communication violated the ì constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel, Geders v. United ì States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976), that right was not violated when a ì trial judge separated a defendant from his lawyer during a ì 15-minute recess after the defendant's direct testimony. Perry v. Leake, 488 U.S. 272 (1989). That numerous constitutional ì doctrines result in narrow differentiations between similar ì circumstances does not mean that this Court has aban- doned ì adjudication in favor of regulation. Id., at 549-550. The final, and more genuine, criticism of the trimester ì framework is that it fails to find the State's interest in ì potential human life compelling throughout pregnancy. No member ì of this Court "nor for that matter, the Solicitor General, Tr. of ì Oral Arg. 42" has ever questioned our holding in Roe that an ì abortion is not the termination of life entitled to Fourteenth ì Amendment protection. 410 U.S., at 159. Accordingly, a State's ì interest in protecting fetal life is not grounded in the ì Constitution. Nor, consistent with our Establishment Clause, can ì it be a theological or sectarian interest. See Thornburgh, 476 ì U.S., at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring). It is, instead, a ì legitimate interest grounded in humanitarian or pragmatic ì concerns. See ante, at 4-5 (opinion of Stevens, J.). But while a State has legitimate interests from the ì outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and ì the life of the fetus that may become a child, ante, at 4, ì legitimate interests are not enough. To overcome the burden of ì strict scrutiny, the interests must be compelling. The question ì then is how best to accommodate the State's interest in potential ì human life with the constitutional liberties of pregnant women. Again, I stand by the views I expressed in Webster: I remain ì convinced, as six other Members of this Court 16 years ago were ì convinced, that the Roe framework, and the viability standard in ì particular, fairly, sensibly, and effectively functions to ì safeguard the constitutional liberties of pregnant women while ì recognizing and accommodating the State's interest in potential ì human life. The viability line reflects the biological facts and ì truths of fetal development; it marks that threshold moment prior ì to which a fetus cannot survive separate from the woman and ì cannot reasonably and objectively be regarded as a subject of ì rights or interests distinct from, or paramount to, those of the ì pregnant woman. At the same time, the viability standard takes ì account of the undeniable fact that as the fetus evolves into its ì postnatal form, and as it loses its dependence on the uterine ì environment, the State's interest in the fetus' potential human ì life, and in fostering a regard for human life in general, ì becomes compelling. As a practical matter, because viability ì follows `quickening'"the point at which a woman feels movement in ≡7É3 ìèher womb"and because viability occurs no earlier than 23 weeks ì gestational age, it establishes an easily applicable standard for ì regulating abortion while providing a pregnant woman ample time ì to exercise her fundamental right with her responsible physician ì to terminate her pregnancy. 492 U.S., at 553-554. Roe's trimester framework does not ignore the State's ì interest in prenatal life. Like Justice Stevens, I agree that ì the State may take steps to ensure that a woman's choice is ì thoughtful and informed, ante, at 29, and that States are free to ì enact laws to provide a reasonable frame- work for a woman to ì make a decision that has such profound and lasting meaning. ì Ante, at 30. But [s]erious questions arise when a State attempts ì to `persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.' Ante, ì at 36. Deci sional autonomy must limit the State's power to ì inject into a woman's most personal deliberations its own views ì of what is best. The State may promote its preferences by ì funding childbirth, by creating and maintaining alternatives to ì abortion, and by espousing the virtues of family, but it must ì respect the individual's freedom to make such judgments. Ante, ì at 6 (opinion of Stevens, J.). As the joint opinion recognizes, ì the means chosen by the State to further the interest in ì potential life must be calculated to inform the woman's free ì choice, not hinder it. Ante, at 35. In sum, Roe's requirement of strict scrutiny as ì implemented through a trimester framework should not be ì disturbed. No other approach has gained a majority, and no other ì is more protective of the woman's fundamental right. Lastly, no ì other approach properly accommodates the woman's constitutional ì right with the State's legitimate interests. ÇÇ! C Application of the strict scrutiny standard results in ì the invalidation of all the challenged provisions. Indeed, as ì this Court has invalidated virtually identical provisions in ì prior cases, stare decisis requires that we again strike them ì down. This Court has upheld informed and written consent ì requirements only where the State has demonstrated that they ì genuinely further important health-related state concerns. See ì Danforth, 428 U. S., at 65-67. A State may not, under the guise ì of securing informed consent, require the delivery of information ì `designed to influence the woman's informed choice between ì abortion or childbirth.' Thornburgh v. American College of ì Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747, 760 (1986), ì (quoting Akron, 462 U. S., at 443-444). Rigid requirements that ì a specific body of information be imparted to a woman in all ì cases, regardless of the needs of the patient, improperly intrude ì upon the discre- tion of the pregnant woman's physician and ì thereby impose an `undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket.' ì Thornburgh, 476 U. S., at 762 (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S., at 67, ì n. 8). ≡7É3 è Measured against these principles, some aspects of the ì Pennsylvania informed-consent scheme are unconstitutional. While ì it is unobjectionable for the Commonwealth to require that the ì patient be informed of the nature of the procedure, the health ì risks of the abortion and of childbirth, and the probable ì gestational age of the unborn child, compare 3205(a)(i)-(iii) ì with Akron, 462 U. S., at 446, n. 37, I remain unconvinced that ì there is a vital state need for insisting that the information be ì provided by a physician rather than a counselor. Id., at 448. ì The District Court found that the physician-only requirement ì necessarily would increase costs to the plaintiff-clinics, costs ì that undoubtedly would be passed on to patients. And because ì trained women counselors are often more understanding than ì physicians, and generally have more time to spend with patients, ì see App. 366a-387a, the physician-only disclosure requirement is ì not narrowly tailored to serve the Commonwealth's interest in ì protecting maternal health. Sections 3205(a)(2)(i)-(iii) of the Act further requires ì that the physician or a qualified non- physician inform the woman ì that printed materials are available from the Commonwealth that ì describe the fetus and provide information about medical ì assistance for childbirth, information about child support from ì the father, and a list of agencies offering that provide adoption ì and other services as alternatives to abortion. Thornburgh ì invalidated biased patient-counseling requirements virtually ì identical to the one at issue here. What we said of those ì requirements fully applies in this case: the listing of agencies in the printed Pennsylvania form ì presents serious problems; it contains names of agencies that ì well may be out of step with the needs of the particular woman ì and thus places the physician in an awkward position and ì infringes upon his or her professional responsibilities. Forcing ì the physician or counselor to present the materials and the list ì to the woman makes him or her in effect an agent of the State in ì treating the woman and places his or her imprimatur upon both the materials and the list. All this is, or comes close to ì being, state medicine imposed upon the woman, not the ì professional medical guidance she seeks, and it officially ì structures "as it obviously was intended to do" the dialogue ì between the woman and her physician. The requirements . . . that the woman be advised that ì medical assistance benefits may be available, and that the father ì is responsible for financial assistance in the support of the ì child similarly are poorly disguised elements of discouragement ì for the abortion decision. Much of this . . ., for many ì patients, would be irrelevant and inappropriate. For a patient ì with a life-threatening pregnancy, the `information' in its very ì rendition may be cruel as well as destructive of the ì physician-patient relationship. As any experienced social worker ì or other counselor knows, theoretical financial responsibility ì often does not equate with fulfillment . . . . Under the guise ≡7É3 ìèof informed consent, the Act requires the dissemination of ì information that is not relevant to such consent, and, thus, it ì advances no legitimate state interest. 476 U. S., at 763. This type of compelled information is the antithesis of ì informed consent, id., at 764, and goes far beyond merely ì describing the general subject matter relevant to the woman's ì decision. That the Commonwealth does not, and surely would not, ì compel similar disclosure of every possible peril of necessary ì surgery or of simple vaccination, reveals the anti-abortion ì character of the statute and its real purpose. Ibid. The 24-hour waiting period following the provision of the ì foregoing information is also clearly unconstitutional. The ì District Court found that the mandatory 24-hour delay could lead ì to delays in excess of 24 hours, thus increasing health risks, ì and that it would require two visits to the abortion provider, ì thereby increasing travel time, exposure to further harassment, ì and financial cost. Finally, the District Court found that the requirement ì would pose especially significant burdens on women living in ì rural areas and those women that have difficulty explaining their ì whereabouts. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 91-902, pp. ì 380a-382a (hereinafter App.). In Akron this Court invalidated a ì similarly arbitrary or inflexible waiting period because, as ì here, it furthered no legitimate state interest. As Justice Stevens insightfully concludes, the mandatory ì delay rests either on outmoded or unacceptable assumptions about ì the decisionmaking capacity of women or the belief that the ì decision to terminate the pregnancy is presumptively wrong. ì Ante, at 8. The requirement that women consider this obvious and ì slanted information for an additional 24 hours contained in these ì provisions will only influence the woman's decision in improper ì ways. The vast majority of women will know this information "of ì the few that do not, it is less likely that their minds will be ì changed by this information than it will be either by the ì realization that the State opposes their choice or the need once ì again to endure abuse and harassment on return to the clinic." Except in the case of a medical emergency, 3206 requires ì a physician to obtain the informed consent of a parent or ì guardian before performing an abortion on an unemancipated minor ì or an incompetent woman. Based on evidence in the record, the ì District Court concluded that, in order to fulfill the ì informed-consent requirement, generally accepted medical ì principles would require an in-person visit by the parent to the ì facility. App. 399a. Although the Court has recognized that the ì State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities ì of children than of adults, the State nevertheless must ì demonstrate that there is a significant state interest in ì conditioning an abortion . . . that is not present in the case of ≡7É3 ìèan adult. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 74-75 (emphasis added). The ì requirement of an in-person visit would carry with it the risk of ì a delay of several days or possibly weeks, even where the parent ì is willing to consent. While the State has an interest in ì encouraging parental involvement in the minor's abortion ì decision, 3206 is not narrowly drawn to serve that interest. Finally, the Pennsylvania statute requires every facility ì performing abortions to report its activities to the ì Commonwealth. Pennsylvania contends that this requirement is ì valid under Danforth, in which this Court held that recordkeeping ì and reporting requirements that are reasonably directed to the ì preservation of maternal health and that properly respect a ì patient's confidentiality are permissible. 428 U. S., at 79-81. The Commonwealth attempts to justify its required reports ì on the ground that the public has a right to know how its tax ì dollars are spent. A regulation designed to inform the public ì about public expenditures does not further the Commonwealth's ì interest in protecting maternal health. Accordingly, such a ì regulation cannot justify a legally significant burden on a ì woman's right to obtain an abortion. The confidential reports concerning the identities and ì medical judgment of physicians involved in abortions at first ì glance may seem valid, given the State's interest in maternal ì health and enforcement of the Act. The District Court found, ì however, that, notwithstanding the confidentiality protections, ì many physicians, particularly those who have previously ì discontinued performing abortions because of harassment, would ì refuse to refer patients to abortion clinics if their names were ì to appear on these reports. App. 447a-448a. The Commonwealth ì has failed to show that the name of the referring physician ì either adds to the pool of scientific knowledge concerning ì abortion or is reasonably related to the Commonwealth's interest ì in maternal health. I therefore agree with the District Court's ì conclusion that the confidential reporting requirements are ì unconstitutional insofar as they require the name of the ì referring physician and the basis for his or her medical ì judgment. In sum, I would affirm the judgment in No. 91-902 and ì reverse the judgment in No. 91-744 and remand the cases for ì further proceedings. ╠╠! III At long last, The Chief Justice admits it. Gone are the ì contentions that the issue need not be (or has not been) ì considered. There, on the first page, for all to see, is what ì was expected: We believe that Roe was wrongly decided, and that ì it can and should be overruled consistently with our traditional ì approach to stare decisis in constitutional cases. Post, at 1. ì If there is much reason to applaud the advances made by the joint ì opinion today, there is far more to fear from The Chief Justice's ì opinion. ≡7É3 è The Chief Justice's criticism of Roe follows from his ì stunted conception of individual liberty. While recognizing that ì the Due Process Clause protects more than simple physical ì liberty, he then goes on to construe this Court's personal ì liberty cases as establishing only a laundry list of particular ì rights, rather than a principled account of how these particular ì rights are grounded in a more general right of privacy. Post, at ì 9. This constricted view is reinforced by The Chief Justice's ì exclusive reliance on tradition as a source of fundamental ì rights. He argues that the record in favor of a right to ì abortion is no stronger than the record in Michael H. v. Gerald ì D., 491 U. S. 110 (1989), where the plurality found no ì fundamental right to visitation privileges by an adulterous ì father, or in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), where the ì Court found no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy, ì or in a case involving the firing of a gun . . . into another ì person's body. Post, at 9-10. In The Chief Justice's world, a ì woman considering whether to terminate a pregnancy is entitled to ì no more protection than adulterers, murderers, and so- called ì sexual deviates. Given The Chief Justice's exclusive reliance on ì tradition, people using contraceptives seem the next likely candi ì date for his list of outcasts. Even more shocking than The Chief ì Justice's cramped notion of individual liberty is his complete ì omission of any discussion of the effects that compelled ì childbirth and motherhood have on women's lives. The only ì expression of concern with women's health is purely instrumental ì "for The Chief Justice, only women's psychological health is a ì concern, and only to the extent that he assumes that every woman ì who decides to have an abortion does so without serious ì consideration of the moral implications of their decision." ì Post, at 25-26. In short, The Chief Justice's view of the State's ì compelling interest in maternal health has less to do with health ì than it does with compelling women to be maternal. Nor does The Chief Justice give any serious consideration ì to the doctrine of stare decisis. For The Chief Justice, the ì facts that gave rise to Roe are surprisingly simple: women ì become pregnant, there is a point somewhere, depending on medical ì technology, where a fetus becomes viable, and women give birth to ì children. Ante, at 13. This characterization of the issue thus ì allows The Chief Justice quickly to discard the joint opinion's ì reliance argument by asserting that reproductive planning could ì take . . . virtually immediate accout of a decision overruling ì Roe. Id., at 14 (internal quotations omitted).